On Robustness of Deep Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Study on the Effect of Architecture and Weight Initialization to Susceptibility and Transferability of Adversarial Attacks by Ben Daya, Ibrahim et al.
On Robustness of Deep Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Study on the Effect of Architecture
and Weight Initialization to Susceptibility and Transferability of Adversarial Attacks
Ibrahim Ben Daya University of Waterloo, ON, Canada
Mohammad Javad Shafiee University of Waterloo, ON, Canada
Michelle Karg Continental Automotive, Germany
Christian Scharfenberger Continental Automotive, Germany
Alexander Wong University of Waterloo, ON, Canada
Abstract
Neural network models have shown state of the art performance in
several applications. However it has been observed that they are
susceptible to adversarial attacks: small perturbations to the input
that fool a network model into mislabelling the input data. These
attacks can also transfer from one network model to another, which
raises concerns over their applicability, particularly when there are
privacy and security risks involved. In this work, we conduct a study
to analyze the effect of network architectures and weight initial-
ization on the robustness of individual network models as well as
transferability of adversarial attacks. Experimental results demon-
strate that while weight initialization has no affect on the robustness
of a network model, it does have an affect on attack transferability
to a network model. Results also show that the complexity of a
network model as indicated by the total number of parameters and
MAC number is not indicative of a network’s robustness to attack
or transferability, but accuracy can be; within the same architec-
ture, higher accuracy usually indicates a more robust network, but
across architectures there is no strong link between accuracy and
robustness.
1 Introduction
The field of computer vision has seen major breakthroughs in re-
cent years thanks to deep learning, with many network models for
recognition tasks such as classification and segmentation now be-
ing deployed in more and more complex systems [1]. Deep neural
network models have shown phenomenal success in solving com-
plex problems. However, it has been demonstrated that they are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [2]; malicious perturbations - of-
ten small enough to be imperceptible to the human eye - that have
been optimized to fool network models into making mistakes. This
raises concerns, particularly when networks are deployed in safety-
critical systems like autonomous driving. While most of these at-
tacks require explicit knowledge of the underlying network model
(white-box attacks), several works have shown that adversarial ex-
amples generated for one network model may successfully attack
another; a property referred to as transferability which may be
leveraged to perform black-box attacks [4].
A few studies in literature have looked into the transferability of
adversarial examples. Szegedy et al. [2] were the first to examine
this, their work looked into the transferability between different net-
work models trained over MNIST [5]. Goodfellow et al. [3] followed
that study on MNIST and CIFAR-10 [6]. Papernot et al. [8] looked
into the feasability of constructing a substitute network model to at-
tack a black-box target network model. Liu et al. [4] expanded that
study to include larger network models and a larger dataset. All
studies showed that it is possible for adversarial attacks to trans-
fer across network models. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [9] showed
that a universal perturbation for each network model exists which
can transfer across images. This encouraged a steadily growing
research into adversarial defence.
Many defences to adversarial attacks have been proposed along
three main research directions: 1) using modified training/input, 2)
modifying networks, and 3) using external models as network add-
ons [1]. However, we’ve yet to see a satisfactory defence to these
attacks. It is often shown that counter-counter measures can be
devised to successfully attack a defended network model [10, 11],
with Akhtar and Mian [1] noting that this should encourage new
defence methods to provide an estimate for their robustness to ob-
vious counter-counter measures.
Inherent network model robustness has been previously stud-
ied. Rozsa et al. [12] empirically analyzed the correlation between
network model accuracy and robustness, observing that network
models with higher accuracy generally exhibit more robustness to
adversarial examples. The study covered eight network models
trained on ImageNet under three attacks. Madry et al. [13] studied
the effect of network model capacity on adversarial robustness, ob-
serving that increasing the capacity of the network model increases
its robustness and decrease attack transferability. A similar conclu-
sion was reached by Kurakin et al. [14]. Madry’s study covered a
network model trained on MNIST and another trained on CIFAR-
10, while Kurakin’s covered a network model on ImageNet.
In this research, we expand on previous studies to look into the
effect of network model initialization and architecture on robustness
and transferability. We cover seven network model architectures,
with three different weight initializations, on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in section 2, we outline
the parameters of the study. Section 3 details our experimental
results and discussion. We conclude the paper in section 4.
2 Methodology
In this section, we first describe the adversarial attacks used in this
study. Next, we list the models and datasets used. Finally, we de-
fine the measures we use to quantify robustness and transferability.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks consist of perturbations added to the original
input to a network model in order to change its original prediction.
In this study, we look into three adversarial attacks: fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [3] and its extension iterative FGSM [14, 13]
as well as one-pixel attacks [15].
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3] is a single-step white-
box attack that uses the loss of the network as a perturbation to
input x:
xadv = x+ ε · sign(∇xL( f (x;θ),y)) (1)
where xadv is the adversarial image, x the original image, ε is a
small scalar that restricts the norm of the perturbation, sign(.) is
the sign function, ∇ computes the gradient of the loss function L(.)
between the network prediction y under model parameters θ .
Iterative FGSM [14, 13] relies on taking multiple smaller steps
instead of taking on big step like in FGSM. This increases the
chance of fooling the original network.
One-Pixel Attack [15] is a black-box attack where only one
pixel in the image is changed to fool the network model. Adversarial
examples are computed using Differential Evolution [16], where an
initial set of candidate pixel population is modified to create children
that compete with its parents for fitness in the next iteration. This
method makes it possible to generate adversarial examples with
only probabilistic labels of the targeted network model as input.
2.2 Models and Datasets
In this study, we use a variety of network models ranging from com-
plex network models to lightweight network models suitable for em-
bedded applications. We used publicly available code for model
definitions. Models trained include AlexNet [17], GoogLeNet [18],
LeNet, LeNet-5 [5], Network in Network (NIN) [19], ResNet-20 [20],
SqueezeNet [21], and VGG-16 [22]. Three different initializations
were studied: Gaussian, MSRA, and Xavier. Whenever possible,
we trained each network model on all three initializations. However,
some network models wouldn’t converge or had poor accuracies,
and were therefore not included. Tables 1 and 2 list all networks in
this study and their accuracy on the corresponding test set.
For both MNIST and CIFAR-10, a study set of 1000 randomly
selected images were chosen to test robustness and transferabil-
ity. Since it is less meaningful to examine transferability of an ad-
versarial image when models don’t classify the input correctly, we
ensured that the randomly chosen images are given the correct
label by all network models.
2.3 Quantitative Measures
In this study, we look into individual network robustness to adver-
sarial attacks as well as the transferability of attacks from one net-
work to another. We also include a measure of network model
complexity to look for a link between complexity and robustness.
To quantify the robustness of individual networks, attack suc-
cess rate is used. This is simply the percentage of adversarial
example that successfully fool a network model. A lower success
rate indicates a network is more robust. To quantify a measure of
Arch Params MAC
Gaussian MSRA Xavier
ID Accuracy ID Accuracy ID Accuracy
AlexNet 3.8500 0.5959 0 0.9391 1 0.9939 2 0.9936
GoogLeNet 6.4000 0.0170 3 0.9753 4 0.9917 5 0.9910
LeNet 0.4311 0.0023 6 0.9615 7 0.9911 8 0.9904
NIN 6.5500 0.2032 9 0.9738 10 0.9885 11 0.9918
ResNet20 0.2791 0.0316 12 0.9422 13 0.9717 14 0.9880
SqueezeNet 0.7265 0.0296 15 0.9910 16 0.8997 17 0.9882
Table 1: MNIST network models used in this study, with the corre-
sponding number of (in millions) and MAC operations (in billions),




ID Accuracy ID Accuracy ID Accuracy
AlexNet 4.2500 1.0100 0 0.7900 1 0.8040 2 0.7731
GoogLeNet 6.4000 0.0328 X X X X 3 0.7517
LeNet-5 0.0896 0.0123 4 0.7960 5 0.6429 6 0.6581
NIN 6.5500 0.2564 7 0.8388 X X X X
SqueezeNet 0.7276 0.0411 8 0.8042 X X X X
VGG-16 33.6400 0.3321 X X 9 0.6581 10 0.7010
Table 2: CIFAR-10 network models used in this study, with the cor-
responding number of paramters (in millions) and MAC operations
(in billions), accuracy of each initialization, and the network model
ID for this study listed. Network models with initializations that
wouldn’t allow it to train (or would train with very poor accuracy)
are marked by ’X’.
transferability between two models, we compute the percentage of
adversarial examples generated for one network that successfully
fool the other network, henceforth reffered to as transfer rate. Net-
work complexity is set by the total number of parameters as well as
the number of multiply-accumlate (MAC) operations.
3 Experimental Results and Discussion
This section details our experimental results and provides some
discussion. We first discuss FGSM attack on MNIST and CIFAR10.
In the figures detailing the results, the labels for rows correspond
to the network model used to generate the adversarial example,
and the labels for columns correspond to the network model the
generated adversarial example is transfered to. The shade of each
element corresponds to the transfer rate, while the diagonal is the
attack success rate.
3.1 FGSM and Iterative FGSM Attacks
MNIST: Figure 1 summarizes FGSM and iterative FGSM attacks
on the MNIST study set under three noise levels: ε = 0.1, 0.2,
and 0.3. The transfer rate and attack success rate go up as noise
level increases, and with iterative FGSM, attack success rate is
higher than FGSM while transferability is lower. AlexNet, NIN, and
SqueezeNet seem to be the most robust, while ResNet20 seems
to be the most susciptable to both attacks. One interesting obser-
vation is the Gaussian initialized AlexNet and LeNet are inherently
robust, with attack success rate close to zero for LeNet and zero
for AlexNet. We have no explanation as to why this is the case.
CIFAR10: Figure 2 summarize FGSM and iterative FGSM at-
tacks on the CIFAR10 study set under three different noise levels:
ε = 2, 4, and 8. The transfer rate and attack success rate go up as
noise level increases, and with iterative FGSM, attack success rate
is higher than FGSM. Unlike MNIST tests, transfer rate is higher
with iterative FGSM. NIN and SqueezeNet seem to be the most
robust to the two attacks, while LeNet-5 seems to be the most
susciptible. There seems to be no noticable difference made by
initialization and robustness to FGSM and iterative FGSM, with all
AlexNets, LeNet-5s, and VGG-16s showing similar transfer rates
and attack success rates.
3.2 One Pixel Attack
MNIST: Figure 3 summarizes one pixel attack on the MNIST study
set. This attack had very low success overall on MNIST images,
highest being 3.5% success rate on Gaussian initialized LeNet.
While there aren’t enough successfull atacks to make any solid
conclusions, it is interesting to observe that the two most robust
networks to FGSM and iterative FGSM (Gaussian initialized AlexNet
and LeNet) have the highest transfer rates. However, we do ob-
serve that examples generated from all AlexNets and the NIN have
higher transfer rate to other networks.
Fig. 1: Summary of MNIST FGSM (left) and iterative FGSM (right)
attacks at low (top), medium (middle), and high (bottom) FGSM
noise levels. Rows represent network models used to generate ad-
versarial attacks, columns are network models generated attacks
are transferred to. The diagonal shows attack success rate, all
other elements show transfer rate.
CIFAR10: Figure 3 summarizes one pixel attack on the CI-
FAR10 study set. This attack had moderate success when com-
pared to FGSM and iterative FGSM, with the highest success rate
of 48% seen on Xavier initialized SqueezeNet, MSRA initialized
VGG-16 being very susciptible as well. Gaussian initialized AlexNet
seems to be the most robust; both in terms of attack success rate
as well as transfer rate. Xavier initialized SqueezeNet seems to
have the highest transfer rate.
3.3 Discussion
For FGSM attacks, it seems that weight initialization mostly has no
significant affect on attack success rate, with architecture provid-
ing the most significant variance. This true for both MNIST and CI-
FAR10 study sets. The only exceptions are the Gaussian initialized
AlexNet and LeNet, with the attack success rate being unusually
low. Weight initialization does seem to have an affect on transfer-
ability, with Gaussian initialized network models having generally
higher transfer rates, and Xavier initialized networks having gen-
erally lower transfer rates. Similar observations can be made for
iterative FGSM. For CIFAR-10, it seems that all 3 AlexNets gen-
erate adversarial examples that have a high transfer rate to other
network models when compared to adversarial examples gener-
ated from other models.
For one pixel attacks, there is no discernable pattern for attack
success rate and weight initialization, or chosen architecture and
attack success rate. There is some pattern with Gaussian initial-
ization and transfer rate in MNIST for AlexNet, GoogLeNet, and
LeNet. But it seems there are other factors contributing to the in-
herent network model susciptibility to one pixel attack.
Looking at tables 1 and 2, there is no clear link between net-
work complexity and inherent robustness to any of the three at-
tacks. For example, Gaussian initialized LeNet-5 and SqueezeNet
- two relatively simple networks with low number of parameters and
Fig. 2: Summary of CIFAR-10 FGSM (left) and iterative FGSM
(right) attacks at low (top), medium (middle), and high (bottom)
FGSM noise levels. Rows represent network models used to gen-
erate adversarial attacks, columns are network models generated
attacks are transferred to. The diagonal shows attack success rate,
all other elements show transfer rate.
MAC operations - on CIFAR10 had varying robustness to one pixel
attack, with attack success rate being 20.1% and 48.5% respec-
tively. Xavier initialized NIN and Gaussian initialized GoogLeNet -
two networks with relatively high number of parameters - on MNIST
had varying robustness to MNIST, with attack success rate at ε =
0.1 being 14.6% and 54.9% respectively. There is some correla-
tion between accuracy and robustness observed, but only within
the same architecture. For example: Gaussian initialized AlexNet
and LeNet-5 both have a similar accuracy at 79%, but had itera-
tive FGSM success rate at ε = 2 is 20.6% and 77.2% respectively,
while AlexNets, LeNet-5s, and VGG-16s had a clear trend where
higher accuracy meant more robust network models.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we looked into the affect of weight initialization and
architecture on network model robustness. Our study spanned 18
networks trained on MNIST and 11 trained on CIFAR10, three dif-
ferent weight initializations, and three adversarial attacks. We ob-
served that while initialization does not have a discernible affect
on success rate of an attack, it does affect the transferability of an
attack from one network to another. We also observed that the net-
work complexity given by the total number of parameters and MAC
is not indicative of a network model’s success rate. Finally, we ob-
serve that across the same architecture, higher accuracy indicates
a more robust network model, but that is not the case when looking
at networks of different architectures.
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Fig. 3: Summary of one pixel attack on MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10
(right). Rows represent network models used to generate adver-
sarial attacks, columns are network models generated attacks are
transferred to. The diagonal shows attack success rate, all other
elements show transfer rate.
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